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from and the plaintiff has the burden in the sense of producing evidence to the
judge to overcome this presumption in order to succeed. It seems that Kentucky
has followed the general pattern set forth by Wigmore without adopting the
language therein.
In conclusion, perhaps a few words should be said as to the justice of the
above deductions. Who ought to have the burden of proving contributory negligence? Should the plaintiff be required, as an element of his cause of action, to
negative contributory negligence on his part in his plea, and prove that he was
in the exercise of due care? It has been argued that "When a plaintiff seeks to
possess himself of money from a defendant's pocket, that plaintiff should be saddled with a complete and not merely a partial duty to show that he is entitled to
that money. If he was negligent, and if his negligence contributed to the happening of the accident, he should not be entitled to a cent.
Contributory
negligence on his part would be no less effective than freedom from negligence on
the defendanes part to defeat his action. Absence of contributory negligence no
less constitutes a part of his cause of action than does negligence of the defendant."' It might, however, be argued with equal force and more reason that
the burden ought to be on the defendant. Just how many elements must the plaintiff negative to make out a cause of action? If the plaintiff is required to negative
contributory negligence, should he also be required to anticipate his possible
failure to succeed on this point and plead last clear chance? How many possibilities must the plaintiff anticipate and negative m order to make out a cause of
action for negligence? It seems that evidence of contributory negligence in most
cases would be equally available to the defendant and it is no more than just to
place the burdens of pleading and proving such matter on him to defeat the
plaintiff's case.
GLADNEY HAIViLLE

RES GESTAE IN KENTUCKY
The use of Latin words and phrases is very often the only means by which a
concept can be designated or described in the legal profession. The subpoena,
mandamus and habeas corpus are of such nature. This is due to the fact that for
many years Latin was the exclusive language in the legal profession, and there is
no English equivalent for such terms. Fundamentally there is no sound objection
to their use when they convey a clear and distinct legal meaning. They become
objectionable when their meaning is obscured by attempting to include within the
term numerous different and distinct legal principles. Subject to such an objection
is the term res gestae as used in connection with the admission of hearsay evidence.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has used this term freely. With a view toward at
least discovenng the sense in which it is used by the Court, or possibly advocating
that it be discarded, the writer proposes to examine some Kentucky cases vherem
the term has been used.
Res gestae is defined by Ballentine as "Matter incidental to the main fact
and explanatory of it, including acts and words which are so closely connected
therewith as to constitute a part of the transaction, and without a knowledge of
92 1 SHEAiImhAN A-D REDFIELD ON NEGLIGENCE

sec. 124 (Rev. ed. 1941).
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which the main fact ught not be properly understood.
"' According to
Webster it is "tlungs done; deeds; exploits; esp. Law, the facts which form the
environment of a litigated issue; the things or matters accompanying and incident
to a transaction or event. They are adrmssible in evidence as illustrating or explaimng it."-" The Kentucky Court attempted to define the term in Louisville Ry.
Co. v. Johnson s Adm r, as follows:'
"But, generally speaking, the rule m this State is that
declarations which would otherwise be incompetent to be admissible
as a part of the res gestae must be made by one of the actors in the
affair, contemporaneous in point of time with the principal transaction
under consideration, be made at or near to the place of its occurrence,
"
and illustrate or explain how or what caused it to happen.
An examination of these definitions reveals that the term contains only two
distinct and separate pnnciples of evidence - the verbal act and spontaneous exclamation. Yet many of the courts have included within the term at least six
separate principles.' In. Kentucky it seems that the principles included are: (1)
verbal act, (2) spontaneous exclamation, (3) circumstantial evidence, (4) mental
and physical condition, and (5) admissions of an agent. Perhaps it would be advisable to give a brief definition of these principles along with the reason why each
constitutes an exception, if in fact it does, to the hearsay rule, and discuss Kentucky cases which seemingly employ each principle.
It should be pointed out that the main objection to the admission of hearsay
evidence is that the person making the statement was not under oath and not subject to cross-examination. Therefore, in order for it to be admitted for its truth
there must be (1) a necessity, and (2) a circumstantial guaranty of its truth.
Both elements are present m the true exceptions to the hearsay rule, but are not
necessarily present in all the principles included within the term res gestae. For
instance, the circumstantial guaranty of truth need not be present in a statement
which is admitted as a verbal act, because it is not admitted for its truth but to
explain the legal act.
(1) Verbal act. According to Wigniore, the verbal act, which is broadly
defined as the utterances accompanying an independent and ambiguous legal act,
is not an exception to the hearsay rule because it is not admitted for its truth
but merely to explain the legal act. A good example is A handing money to B
and making the statement that it is in payment of a debt. C who heard A make
tlus statement is permitted to testify as to what A said because it is not offered
for its truth but to explain the equivocal act of passing money. Logically, the
position that the hearsay rule is not applicable to the verbal act, seems sound.
Such evidence is original and not subject to the limitations of the hearsay rule.
The verbal act concept was recoguized and used by the Kentucky Court
in the early case of Howk v. McManama.' In that case the plaintiff sued on a note
allegedly executed by the defendant who denied making it. A statement made
by the plaintiff as he started to leave that he intended to settle with the de'BALLENTJNE s LAW DIcTioNARY

(1930).

'WEBSTER S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED

3131 Ky. 277, 281, 115 S.W 207, 209 (1909).
' 6 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE secs. 1768, 1769 (3d ed. 1940).
' 6 id. sec. 1772.
'4 Ky.Opin. 234 (1870).

(2d ed. 1944).
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fendant even if he had to take his note, was held admissible. The Court quoted
Greenleaf as follows; "Declarations made at the time of the transaction, and expressive of its character, motive or object, are regarded as "verbal acts indicating
a present purpose and intention, and are therefore admitted in proof like any
other material facts." Thus it is seen that the Court recogmzed the term as a
separate principle of evidence, and possibly considered it not as an exception
to the hearsay rule, but rather as original evidence.
In Mann v. Cavanaugh, the defendant in an ejectment action was permitted
to testify as to statements he made to others with reference to gvng them permission to enter upon the land m dispute for the purpose of cutting trees. This
was held competent as a part of the res gestae. The Court seemed to place
emphasis on the fact that the statements were made within the boundaries of the
disputed land. Apparently, it was felt that this was a verbal act, the equivocal act
being the continuous possession, and the statements were admitted to explain this
act, if this conclusion, which seems to be the only logical one to justify the admission,' is correct, the term res gestae has not been extended to include a prnciple not already recognized. Furthermore, the case seems to stand for the
proposition that the hearsay rule is not applicable to the verbal act. Tis observation follows from the statement being admitted even though there was no circumstantial guaranty of truth due to the fact that it was self-serving and made by the
witness himself.
The term verbal act was used in the case of Owensboro City Ry. Co. v. Rowland,' but the statement was also referred to as being a part of the res gestae. The
statement admitted was made by a repairman after he inspected defendant's car.
It was held admissible as a verbal act. Since the repairman was an agent of defendant and was acting within the scope of emplopment m making the inspection,
it would seem to be admissible as a vicarious admission and not as a verbal act
because statement was made after the act was completed.
Five years later in the case of Barrett's Adm r v. Brand," in admitting statements made by a doctor as he performed an operation, the Court merely referred
to it as being part of the res gestae. However, in discussing the res gestae rule the
Court said: "This rule renders competent statements, acts, or conduct accompanying or-so nearly connected with the main transaction as to form a part of it."' In
addition a rule was quoted from Ruling Case Law which stated that such statements were of the nature of verbal acts. It would, therefore, appear that the verbal
act was still recognized as a separate principle, but had been placed along with
other principles under the elusive and catch-all phrase res gestae. The Court's discussion pointed out that there are many exceptions to the hearsay rule provided
the circumstantial guaranty of truth is present. Since the Court apparently regarded the statements in this case as a verbal act, it would appear that the
verbal act was considered an exception to the hearsay rule.
Other situations where the statement was admitted as res gestae, but which
could obviously be classified as a verbal act are: a statement a conductor made
to the deceased as he handed him a piece of paper; =' a statement made by the
'110 Ky. 776, 62 S.W 854 (1901).
1778 (3d ed. 1940).
(1913).
10179 Ky. 740, 201 S.W 311 (1918).
"Id. at 745, 201 S.W at 333.
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. McDonald, 239 Ky. 258, 39 S.W 2d 253
(1931).
86 WIcGNOaE, EVIDENCE sec.
'152 Ky. 175, 158 S.W 206
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deceased as he touched a wire;" and declarations made by a buyer relative to and
contemporaneous with his acts in removing goods. 4
Although there is a conflict in some of the cases discussed, it seems that the
Kentucky Court does recognize the principle of a verbal act, but in most cases
and especially the later ones it has. been included in the term res gestae. Apparently the present view of the Court is that the verbal act is an exception to the
hearsay rule, notwithstanding the implication in the earlier cases to the contrary
and the fact that admssions have been allowed under this theory when there
was an absence of a circumstantial guaranty of truth.
(2) Spontaneous exclamation. The spontaneous exclamation is described as a
true exception to the hearsay rule and must contain the following elements: (1) an
occurence startling enough to produce a nervous excitement which renders the
utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must be made while
under influence of shock and excitement so as to preclude fabrication; (3) and
the utterance must relate to the occurence."
The Kentucky Court recognizes the spontaneous exclamation as an exception
to the hearsay rule, but like many other distinct principles it has been included
in the term res gestae. As pointed out previously the definition of res gestae as
given in Louisville By. Co. v. Johnsons Adm r," employs the language of spontaneous exclamation but limits to declarations made by actors in the occurrence
and excludes those made by bystanders.'
In Norton s Adm r v. Winstead,' the brother of the deceased who reached
him three minutes after defendant had allegedly shot him was allowed to testify
in a civil case as follows: "My brother said he was sitting in the seat. Winstead
jumped on the horse and started to shoot him again, and he put his hands up and
begged him not to, said he had already killed him, and he jumped on his horse
and ran through the field." 9 The whole statement was admitted as res gestae,
but the reasons given definitely indicate that it was recogmzed as a spontaneous
exclamation. The Court in effect said that the statement had all the attributes of a
"dying declaration," which it stated would not be adimssible in civil actions unless
a part of the res gestae or against interest." It would seem to be less confusing if
the statements were designated as a spontaneous exclamation rather than placed
under the indefinite term res gestae.
Convincing proof that the Court recognzed the prmciple is evidenced in the
case of Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Earls Adm r;' where statements made by the
70(

y & W Va. Power Co. v. Brown s Adm x, 281 Ky. 133, 135 S.W 2d

"Weil v. Silverstone, 69 Ky. 698 (1869).

6 WicmoiI, EVIDENCE sec. 1750 (3d ed. 1940).
"See note 3 supra.
"Lousville & Cincinnati Packet Co. v. Samuels Adm x, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 979
(1900) seems to hold that the spontaneous exclamation of a bystander is admissible; but the Court in Louisville Ry. Co. v. Johnson s Adin r, note 3 supra, made
the observation that except for the misleading statement in L. & N. R. R. Co. v.
Carothers, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1673, 65 S.W 833 (1901), there were no cases which
had admitted bystander s exclamations. In Brandenburg v. Commonwealth, 260
Ky. 70, 74, 83 S.W 2d 862, 864 (1935), the Court merely stated that there was a
conflict in the Kentucky decisions on this point.
"218 Ky. 488, 291 S.W 723 (1927).
"Id. at 489, 291 S.W at 723.
"Prudential Ins. Co. v. Keeling s Adin x, 271 Ky. 558, 561, 112 S.W 2d 994,
996 (1938).
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driver of defendant's bus five minutes after the accident and while he was still
pinned under the bus were admitted as res gestae. The following excerpt wherein
the term spontaneous expression is used seems conclusive: "
under the immediate influence of the principal transaction and as a spontaneous expression of
the thought created by or springing out of the transaction itself, and so near m
point of time as to exclude the presumption that it was the result of premeditation
or design." = (Italics writer s)
Further illustrations of this recognition is the admission of a driver s statement
made about one minute after an accident to the effect that it was her fault because the brakes failed.' Clearly, this would be admissible as a spontaneous exclamation or as an extrajudicial admission, but the Court in quoting from the
Consolidated Coach Corp. case left no doubt that it was considered a spontaneous
exclamation. In Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke," a declaration by the msured to the effect that he shot himself made immediately after he was shot, was
admitted as a part of the res gestae and as a declaration against interest. All the
elements of a spontaneous exclamation are present. It could also be classified as
a declaration against interest because the policy provided that it was void if insured met death by ins own hand within a year from the date of the policy, and
it also provided that he could change the beneficiary. Since the beneficiary had
no vested interest until the death of the insured without change of beneficiary,
the statement that he shot himself was against the pecuniary and proprietary interest of the insured. The Court pointed out that a declaration against interest
was admissible even though not a part of the res gestae. A final illustration is the
admission of a statement made by insured about fifteen minutes after the alleged
injury that caused Ins death, and while he was apparently in great pain and
under the influence of shock.' Here the Court stressed spontaneity rather than
nearness of time as the determining factor.
From the foregoing discussion of cases it is safe to conclude that the Kentucky Court does recognize the separate principle of spontaneous exclamation, and
has designated it as "spontaneous expression." Therefore, there is no valid reason why cases involving this principle should be classified under the term res
gestae. It deserves a separate recognition. Should such recognition be accorded
it, the term res gestae would be clarified at least to the extent of removing one
element therefrom.
(3) Circumstantial Evidence. Circumstantial evidence means that the prncipal facts in issue are only inferred from one or more circumstances which have
been established directly.' This principle is certainly recognized by the Kentucky Court in many cases without reference to the term res gestae.' However,
in two cases involving accidents, purely circumstantial evidence was admitted as
part of the res gestae. The first case, Sterns Coal Co. v. Evans Adm r," was an
-268 Ky. 814, 94 S.W 2d 6 (1986).
=Id. at 818, 94 S.W 2d at 8.
Sparks Bus Line Inc. v. Spears, 276 Ky. 600, 124 S.W 2d 1031 (1989).
2'276 Ky. 151, 128 S.W 2d 811 (1988).
National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Hedges, 233 Ky. 840, 27 S.W 2d
422 (1930).
- Perry s Adm x v. Inter-Southern Life Ins. Co., 248 Ky. 491, 58 S.W 2d 906
(1933). 1 WiemoE, EVMENCE see. 25 (3d ed. 1940).
'Aubrey s Adm x v. Kent, 292 Ky. 740, 167 S.W 2d 831 (1982); Smith v.
Ward, 280 Ky. 173, 182 S.W 2d 762 (1939); Harkey v. Haddox 244 Ky. 880, 50
S.W 2d 955 (1932).
'33 Ky. L. Rep. 755, 111 S.W 308 (1908).
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action for death caused by a coal dust explosion. Evidence that several persons
were killed by the explosion was admitted as part of the res gestae to show its
force and deadly character, and as a circumstance tending to establish defendant's
negligence. This evidence could have been admitted without reference to the
term res gestae, but since it was closely connected with an accident the use of the
term was apparently considered essential. The second case, Throton v. Phillips,'
involved a collision between the defendant's truck and the plaintiff's car. Evidence
as to the length, width, height, weight of the truck, and absence of lights was admitted as res gestae. Since these were only facts from which the main fact in
issue, the defendant's negligence, could be inferred, they were admissible as circumstantial evidence eliminating the need for using the term res gestae.
Certain evidence relative to intention or state of mind may be admitted as
circumstantial evidence. This is particularly true where the condition of the mind
is attempted to be shown by the conduct of the person, and is also true of utterances which are indirect assertions of the state of mind, e.g., "I am Napoleon."
Such assertions to which the hearsay rule is actually inapplicable, are to be distinguished from direct assertions of a state of mind, e.g., "I did not intend to injure Doe," are objectionable as hearsay.' The direct assertions to be admissible
must come within the exception showing mental or physical conditions. This
exception as recognized by the Kentucky Court will now be discussed.
(4) Mental and Physical Condition. The exception is broadly designated as
showing the mental or physical condition of the declarant." Both are included
within the term res gestae as used by the Kentucky Court. In Louisville & N. R.
Co. v. Owens,' an action for malicious prosecution, the statements made by the
defendants agent while he held the plaintiff in custody, were admitted as res
gestae. The agent was a guard in the yards and had arrested the plaintiff on
suspicion of stealing whiskey from one of the cars. There would seem to be
multiple admissibility since the statements could have been admitted under any
of following three principles: verbal act, admission by an agent, or state of mind.
From the language of the opinion it is apparent that the Court relied on the two
latter principles, with perhaps a slight preference toward the state of mind exception m order to prove malice of the agent.
Another case in which the statements were apparently admitted as showing
intent or state of mind or possibly a verbal act is Glisson v. Paducah Ry. & Light
Co." There the plaintiff was injured when the defendant's street car ran into
his wagon. He was taken to the defendant's physician for treatment, but before
the physician would give treatment he secured a written release from plaintiff.
Statements made by the physician in connection with the act of obtaimng the release were admitted as res gestae. If the execution of the release is considered the
main fact in issue, statements made or said in connection with its execution could
be admitted as a verbal act. Perhaps this was the basis for the admission, but in
order to prove the release was secured fraudulently, it seems that the physician s
intent at the time could be shown by statements made by him. Therefore, it
would appear that there were two principles under which the evidence could have
been admitted.
- 262 Ky. 346, 90 S.W 2d 347 (1936).
' 6 WIGMORE. EVIDENCE sec. 1715 (3d ed. 1940).
"i6 id. see. 1716.
'164 Ky. 557, 175 S. W 1039 (1915).
'27 Ky. L. Rep. 965, 87 S.W 305 (1905).
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Statements and letters expressing an intention to commit suicide have been
admitted as res gestae.' Doubtless this is within the state of mind exception.
However, it is submitted that where there are only acts or conduct of the deceased,
e.g., previous attempted suicide, such evidence would be admissible as circumstantial evidence without regard to the hearsay rule.
In the other part of this exception, showing physical condition, the statement
of injured or sick persons to a physician and his expression or statement as to
pain made to or witnessed by a layman, will be considered. Any statement made
to a physician which is necessary for the proper diagnosis and treatment of the
declarant is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. The reason is stated
as follows in Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Wiley:
because it is believed that the motive for telling the
doctor the truth as to his sensations of pain, suffering or history of his
ailment, so as to enable the doctor to relieve the suffering, or save the
life of the patient, is greater than could be the motive of making
merely a self-serving statement to be used m Ins behalf by the man
in some other affair."It was also stated in that case that any natural, spontaneous and usual expression indicating pain or suffering may be shown by any observer, provided the
expression flows immediately and naturally from the pain. This is admitted of
necessity because aside from the testimony of the injured or sick person it is
the only means to determine the existence of pain, and being made under such
circumstances such expressions are in all probability true. The Court in discussing
these statements and expressions did not refer to the term res gestae, but pointed
out that in addition to being admissible under the exception it could also come
in under res gestae as a verbal act. Thus, the implication is that an expression
or statement of pain was considered a separate exception and not under res gestae.
This observation, at least as far as the statement to a physician is concerned, is
somewhat weakened by an earlier case, Shades Admr v. Covington-Cincinnati
Elevated Bridge Co. There statements made to a physician were not admitted
because they were not necessary for proper treatment. But the Court stated that
those necessary for adequate treatment would be admissible as part of the res
gestae.
Again in Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Scalf, such statements made to a physician were referred to as Yes gestae, and the Court quoted at length from the
Shades Admr case on this point. The rule admitting usual and natural expressions of pain was reaffirmed without reference to res gestae.
Summarizing the mental and physical condition exception the following conclusions may be made. Statements showing intention or state of mind are recogmzed as a true exception to the hearsay rule, and are admitted as part of the res
gestae when the elements of necessity and circumstantial guaranty of truth are
present. Any statement made to a physician which is necessary for him to render
proper care is also admitted as res gestae. But a statement as to physical pain
"Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Hewlett, 807 Ky. 171, 210 S.W 2d 852
(1948) (statment); Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Louisville Trust Co., 207 Ky.
654, 269 S.W 1014 (1925) (letter).
184 Ky. 461, 481, 121 S.W 402, 408 (1909).
1119 Ky. 592, 84 S.W 788 (1905).
'155 Ky. 273, 159 S.W 804 (1913),
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not made to a physician for the purpose of secunng treatment is not admissible,
unless it falls witlun some other recognized exception, such as verbal act or
spontaneous exclamation, m which case it is designated as res gestae. Apparently
a usual and natural expression of pain is recognized as an exception to the hearsay rule and is admitted without reference to the term res gestae.
(5) Admissions of an Agent. The last principle included in the term res
gestae is the admission of an agent. It is difficult in some cases to determine
whether the evidence is admitted because it was said in the course of employment, or due to the fact that it is a spontaneous exclamation, verbal act, etc.
Where immediately after an accident the agent makes a statement tending to
indicate it was his fault, it is admitted against the principal as part of the res
gestae.' Usually, the underlying principle is spontaneous exclamation, because in
only rare instances is the statement made within the scope of employment.
In Brumfield v. Consolidated Coach Corp.,' the distinction is not so clear.
The plaintiff in that case was demed passage on the defendant's bus which contained vacant seats. Evidence that the driver in denying her passage acted in an
impudent and insulting manner was adnissible as res gestae, even though the
action was not based on the tortious conduct but rather on an alleged breach of
contract. Two possible principles seem applicable: the verbal act, which would
permit the conduct in denying passage to be admitted in order to explain such
equivocal act, or as an act done by an agent in the course of his employment.
A recent case, Niles v. Steiden Stores, Inc., ° demonstrates that the admission
of an agent in the course of his employment is admissible as res gestae. In that
case the plaintiff was injured when she slipped and fell on defendant's floor. A
butcher of the defendant assisted the plaintiff to her feet, and in response to her
statement that the floor was slippery he acknowledged such fact to be true. This
was held not admissible because not a part of the res gestae. The Court stated
that the declarant had nothing to do with oiling the floors, and the admissions
of an agent were not competent against the principal unless made in the course
of employment.
The term res gestae in connection with the admission of such evidence seems
unnecessary. If the statement was made in the course of employment the prnciples of agency should apply, and where it falls within the classification of a
verbal act or spontaneous exclamation it could be designated as such.
It must be confessed that it was the expectation of the writer, in examimng
the decisions wherein the term res gestae is used, to find at least one case where
evidence was admitted under this term which could not be justified under some
recognized principle of evidence. This expectation was not realized, but in several
instances where the term was used the evidence could have been admitted under
one or more of the several principles. The failure of the Court to designate the
exact principle under which the evidence is admitted, is unfortunate, and is
probably the result of the principle of stare decisis operating to continue the use
of the term. There seems to be no other explanation why such an elusive term
is used to designate several distinct principles of evidence. Perhaps the Court
is not certain which exact principle is applicable, but realizes that the evidence
' Youngblood Truck Lines v. Hatfield, 304 Ky. 600, 201 S.W 2d 567 (1947);
Wimsatt's Adm x v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 285 Ky. 405, 31 S.W 2d 729 (1930);
Lousville Ry. Co. v. Broaddus Adm r, 180 Ky. 298, 202 S.W 054 (1918).
240 Ky. 1, 40 S.W 2d 356 (1931).
°801 Ky. 80, 190 S.W 2d 876 (1945),
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is admissible under some principle and that it is safe to admit it as part of the
res gestae. Every principle included within the term res gestae is recogmzed by
the Court as a separate principle of evidence. Therefore, it is apparent that the
use of the term res gestae is unncessary.
From the foregoing it would seem obvious that the most desirable course
,of action on the part of the Court would be the abandonment of the term res
gestae, and substituting therefor those separate exceptions to the hearsay rule that
have been pointed out as comprising the general term. The least that should
be done is that the Court should verbalize a recognition of a definition of
res gestae as being a categorical term including the five separate exceptions to
the hearsay rule which have been discussed herein; namely;
1. Verbal act
2. Spontaneous exclamation
3. Circumstantial evidence
4. Mental or physical condition
5. Admissions made by agent
HOLLIS E. EDn1MS

PARTIALLY DISCLOSED AGENCY AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
One of the purposes of this note is to deternmne when and to what extent
the distinction between "undisclosed" agency and "partially disclosed" agency is
material in the actual determination of the legal rights and liabilities of principal,
agent and third party. Another purpose is to discuss the duties of the parties as
to disclosure of, and inquiry into, the agency relationship, and determine the consequences of the failure to carry out these duties. A brief discussion also will be
devoted to the theories behind the duties of the parties and the soundness of
these theories in the light of their application.
I. DEFINITION OF TERMS AS USED IN Tins ARTICLE.
A. Agency. A relationship between one party (the agent) and another party
tthe principal), the purpose of which is to create, modify, terminate and otherwise affect contractual relations between the principal and third persons.
B. Fully Disclosed Agency. The relationship where the fact of agency and
the identity of the principal are known by both the agent and the third party.
C. Partially Disclosed Agency. The relationship where the fact of agency is
known by both the agent and the third party, but the name of the principal is
unknown by the third party.
D. Undisclosed Agency. The relationship where the fact of agency is unknown to the third party.
II. LIABILITY OF THE PiNtcIPAL OR AGENT.
One who deals with a fully disclosed agent must normally look only
principal for legal responsibility in matters arising out of such dealings,
absence of any open pledge of the agent's credit.' This rule is basic m the
agency. Furthermore, where the relation of principal and agent legally

to the
in the
law of
exists,

'Whitney v. Wyman, 101 U.S. 392, 396, 25 L. Ed. 1050 (1879); See Gordon
v. Brinton, 55 Wash. 568, 104 Pac. 832, 833 (1909). Throughout this note, cases
where agent acts in excess of his authority are excluded.

